Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to mitigate vulnerabilities in web applications, security detection and prevention are the most important mechanisms for security. However, most existing research focuses on how to prevent an attack at the web application layer, with less work dedicated to setting up a response action if a possible attack happened.
1.

Introduction
Web applications are increasingly important in areas such as the financial sector, e-commerce, egovernment, social media networks, medical data, e-business, academic activities, e-banking, eshopping and e-mail. Furthermore, web applications enable users to interact with back-end data servers to insert, delete and modify data contents by making a website their own space. Unfortunately, these activities have attracted malicious software writers to take advantage of such activities to perform malicious objectives for financial gain (Alazab et al., 2013) .
Today, web applications use multi-tier web application architecture. Such applications break complex tasks into simple tasks to enable modular functional components, easy maintenance, component reusability, parallel execution and security enhancement. Simply, web applications are designed to serve any client to connect to a database through a user's web browser that provides the required service to customers (Cole, 2011; Alazab et al., 2011a) . The database tier is at the heart of web application architecture. It is a place where the data, such as customer information, financial records, health data, plus any other secure data is usually stored. Thus, protecting these data are increasingly important because failure to do so can result in a loss for organizations. An effective approach in network security is safeguarding a database by observing the different layers involved. Database security means stopping unofficial or unplanned disclosure, modification or destruction of data. Moreover, confidential information within a database must be taken into consideration, as well as its availability.
From the web application architecture and the connection between the tiers, if an attacker successfully compromises one of the tiers, the attacker will probably be able to extend the attack and compromise the database tier. For example, an attacker who achieves unauthorized access to financial systems can cause a lot of problems, and currently, there is no single method that can stop him/her (Alazab et al., 2013) .
The Signature based Intrusion Detection System (SIDS) and the Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System (AIDS) have disadvantages. SIDS can only detect known attacks. It also suffers from high false-positive alarms, as it is commonly based on regular expressions and string matching. AIDS also has a high rate of false positives. The new arsenal of crime tool kits, such as Zeus and SpyEye (Alazab et al., 2011b) , require an IIDPS with capability of a response action. Although researchers have proposed many Intrusion Detection System (IDS), research efforts in IDS and response actions are still not connected to each other (Jaiswal and Jain, 2010) .
However, most current intrusion response systems (IRSs) use static corresponding matching to decide a suitable response action to deal with any possible attack (Shameli-Sendi et al., 2012) . The problem with this approach is its inability to take into account the current state of the entire system. In static mapping systems, the generated response actions represent separated models to make the system face few attacks without taking the particular state of attack and the effect on the system into account.
Thus, a new mechanism is needed that links the state of an attack with a suitable response technique. This allows the IRS to select a suitable reply among a number of possible responses, which achieves a high level of security.
We designed and implemented an IIDPS framework that combines the SIDS, AIDS and response action. We present a technique to select the best response against an intrusion. Our IIDPS framework is flexible to accommodate different web application architectures. The communication between the SIDS, AIDS and the intrusion response component is based on the web application architecture.
The main motivations to develop an (IIDPS) at the web application tier with a response action are:
• the malware that targets a database server may not be detected at the network level (Alazab et al., 2013 ); • the IDS that is designed at the network level is not satisfactory to protect database layers against insider threats (Jaiswal and Jain, 2010 ); • individually, SIDS and AIDS do not provide enough security (Alazab et al., 2011b) ; and • it is necessary to mitigate the attacks by providing an appropriate response to an IDS (Shameli-Sendi et al., 2012) .
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the background and related work. In Section 3, we describe our model. Section 4 presents the performance and performance evaluation to this paper. Section 5 provides the conclusion to this paper.
Background and related work
According to the Open Web Application Security Project, the top ten application security risks are presented in Table I , which provides a brief description of the most widely exploited vulnerabilities, along with the occurrence and the impact of each one. According to the report of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, the number of web-related vulnerabilities has increased steadily from 2005 to 2010 (Corporation, 2012) . Table II shows the results from another study by the Web Application Security Consortium's Statistics Project from 2010 (Gordeychik, 2010) that identifies the most popular vulnerabilities in web applications. From this table, we note that all vulnerabilities are exploited in the database tier. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to perform malevolent actions that range from gaining unauthorized account access to achieving an attacker's objectives.
IDSs are hardware or software systems that observe activities on computer systems or computer networks to find abnormal activities (García-Teodoro et al., 2009 ). There are two approaches to analysing events using IDSs: SIDSs and AIDSs. This section provides an overview of both approaches and shows the advantages and disadvantages of the two ISDs.
Signature-based intrusion detection system
Often called a misuse detection system, SIDS is based on pattern matching techniques to find a known attack. In other words, when a known intrusion matches with a malicious string database, an alert is raised. SIDS commonly provides good detection results for specified, well-known attacks. However, SIDS cannot detect zero-day attacks because the signature does not exist in the database until the signature database is updated. The main advantage of a SIDS is that it is very efficient in detecting known attacks without raising false alarms and it can quickly detect an attack. However, SIDS has the disadvantage that a signature must be created for every attack, and zero-day attacks cannot be detected. A SIDS is also prone to false positives, as they are commonly based on regular expressions and string matching. While signatures work well against attacks with a fixed behavioural pattern, they do not work well against the multitude of attack patterns created by a human or self-modifying behavioural characteristic. SIDS has been implemented in many popular tools, such as Snort (Roesch, 1999) and NetSTAT (Vigna and Kemmerer, 1999) . Anomaly detectors detect users' activities that are not the usual behaviour on a computer network. According to this approach, the assumption is that attacker behaviour deviates from normal user behaviour. AIDS builds the profile of users by using data that are accepted as normal behaviour. It then monitors the activities of new users and compares the new data with the obtained profile and tries to detect deviations (Alazab et al., 2012) . Those different from normal behaviors are considered as attacks.
The main benefit of an anomaly-based scheme is the power to detect zero-day malware. The main disadvantage of AIDS is the resultant high rate of false positives (mistakes in determining a nonattack). Table III shows comparisons between signature-based detection and anomaly-based detection (Davis and Clark, 2011; García-Teodoro et al., 2009 ). However, anomaly detection has an advantage over signature-based engines, in that a new attack for which a signature does not exist can be detected if it falls out of the normal traffic patterns.
Up until recently, few approaches have implemented IDS to find anomalies in web applications using SIDS and AIDS. In the literature, many solutions for web application problems have been suggested, but none of them guarantees a high level of security on web applications. Table IV provides a summary of the current research in developing an IDS for web applications.
The focus of the research has been on the development of anomaly-based detection. Several systems with AIDS capability have been proposed, such as SPADE, ADAM (Sekar et al., 2001 ) and NIDES (Faysel and Haque, 2010) . Kruegel and Vigna (2003) proposed anomaly-based techniques to study HTTP traffic at the network layer. They applied different statistical measures to message characteristics such as request type, length and the distribution of characters in the web application. Kruegel, Vigna and Robertson proposed to analyse web servers to access logs and build multiple statistical models to characterize normal values of the parameters from web requests (Dagorn, 2008) . Table IV . Current research in the area of anomaly-based detection on web application
Responses to IDS
Protecting web application from malicious attacks is an essential issue. Intrusion prevention and IDSs have therefore been the topic of a lot of research and have been suggested in a number of papers (Shameli-Sendi et al., 2012) . Nevertheless, after the functionality of prevention and detection, response action is needed as the primary function against any potential attack.
The old style of achieving a response was performed by the security user, who extracted an alarm or warning of danger from the IDS. Then, the security user analysed the logs and any detailed recorded event on the whole system to decide if the attack was presently active and what damage had been done. In older-style response actions, when the IDS detected an attack, it was the responsibility of the security user to prepare an appropriate response. Unfortunately, system administrators are unable to keep up with the pace of the IDS or react to these alerts within a reasonable time limit. Moreover, these manual responses are not flexible and are not very efficient. These manual responses totally depend on the expertise of the system administrator.
Automated response systems replace multiple distributed systems to respond to an alert more quickly and accurately. Even though the intrusion response system component is often integrated with intrusion detection, it receives considerably less attention than the intrusion detection research because of the complexity involved developing and deploying an automated response.
To address the existing intrusion challenge, the response system should be an essential part of the instruction system. Some researchers have proposed detection and response mechanisms to complement existing prevention mechanisms. In 2011, Elshoush and Osman (2011) , declared that the intrusion response had a similar function to an IDS and was part of it by maintaining detection, and alerting and responding to the security operator. A study of the literature has shown there is a weakness in providing an appropriate response to an IDS, as shown in Table IV .
Intrusion response systems can be categorized according the triggered response to passive and response attack. Passive response systems do not make an attempt to reduce damage already caused by the attack or prevent further attacks. They monitor and analyze network traffic activity and alert an operator to possible vulnerabilities and attacks. Their main goal is to notify the organization or issue report about attack information. Active response provides the IDS with the ability to automatically respond to an attack upon detection. This minimizes the damage caused by the attacker by controlling user activity, such as restricting user accounts, terminating hosts, restarting services and delaying suspicious system calls (Stakhanova et al., 2007) .
Intrusion response systems can be also categorized according to the level of automation to notification systems, manual response systems and automatic response systems. Notification systems present details regarding the attack, which are then used to select the right response against attack. The common existing IDSs offer notification response mechanisms. Manual response systems provide a higher level of automation than notification systems. Also they permit the user security to select a suitable response in advance based on the recorded intrusion details. An automatic response system is a mechanism to select a response without human intervention which supplies an instant reply to the intrusion through an automated decision making process. The key improvement of the automation response is decreasing the latency for response action from the time of detection.
Intrusion response systems can be categorized according to response selection mechanism, static mapping and dynamic mapping. Static mapping systems are basically automated manual response systems that match an alert to one already responded to. Static mapping response systems use decision tables to directly map a potential attack situation with an appropriate response. Such an approach is context independent, as it fails to take into consideration the unique circumstances under which the attack was triggered. Dynamic response mapping systems are more advanced than static mapping systems, as the response selection is based on the specific attack metrics (confidence, severity of attack, etc). Taha et al. (2010) , presented analyses of the alerts from one or more IDSs and presented a compact summarized report and high-level view of attempted intrusions which highly improves security effectiveness. Sadoddin and Ghorbani (2009) presented an approach for real-time alert correlation which integrates novel techniques for aggregating alerts into structured patterns and incremental mining of frequent structured patterns.
Intelligent intrusion detection and prevention system
As shown in Section 2, traditional IDS have restrictions, including low flexibility, inability to distinguish novel attacks, high cost, slow updates and lack of extensibility. It also shows that both SIDS and AIDS have drawbacks. The aim of the new system is to design and develop an effective IIDPS that addresses the weakness of SIDS and AIDS. IIDPS combines SIDS, AIDS and Responses to IDS to become an IIDPS. Figure 1 shows an overview of the proposed IIDPS. In our system, AIDSs help to detect unknown attacks, while SIDS detects known attacks. The basic idea of the new system is to take benefits from both SIDS and AIDS to create effective IDS. The IIDPS has three stages: the SIDS stage, the AIDS stage and the response action stage.
The SIDS stage
The SIDS stage simply uses pattern matching to handle the received request from clients. Whether or not this request is legitimate or illegitimate, SIDS will detect a known malicious string attack that has been stored in the database. If the received request has the same pattern as found on the malicious string database, it means the request will be identified on the system as a true attack. As a consequence, stage three is for taking the appropriate response action. Otherwise, if the received request is not found in the malicious string, the AIDS stage handles the request.
Throughout the signature-matching stage, SIDS examines the contents of a user request, checking for the occurrence of well-known intrusion. In SIDS, each signature is specified by a rule that identified a known attack. If user's request is exit of database signature, followed by the action identified by the rule related with that signature is taken. This action is rise an alarm and some of response action against an attack such as no action, Alarm, hold, Abort and disconnect.
It is very important for the IDS to be effective, that is, it should detect a large amount of attack, while still maintaining the false positive. Thus, the good IDS should not generate too many false positives. Reduction from false positives can be achieved when all malware signatures are stored in the database as shown in Figure 2 . The false positive rate is calculated as the following formula:
Also increase true positive, number of detection malware by increase the number of malware that stored in the database, as shown in Figure 3 .
However, specific signature is hardly to generate any false positives, as shown in Figure 4 . As the specific signature is always look for a specific signature. But specific signature has a weakness to detect new and unknown malware. Generic signature is more likely for false positive and more opportunity to detect unknown malware. The next subsection describes in details how the AIDS stage can generate automated signatures of attack. The AIDS stage
The second stage is the AIDS stage. The main idea of this stage is to overcome the shortfalls of the SIDS stage. The main assumption is that any request received from users is an anomaly request, unless proven otherwise. In this second stage, the system gathers information from the user request and, if any suspicious event is detected, the system will store it in the database. Next, it decides if it is a normal or abnormal behaviour. The result from this stage means the system will take precautions against the new attack. The profile information collected from the users' activities by using the learning mode enables identification of the appropriate response to any attack, as shown at the bottom of Figure 1 .
Response action stage
The final element of our approach is taking appropriate response actions against an anomaly if it is found. A response action is a set of instructions that is carried out, especially a certain attack. (Corporation, 2003) . By using the DREAD model, it is possible to arrive at the risk rating for a given threat by asking the following questions:
• We applied risk assessment to identify the risk level for an application attack. In Figure 2 , the risk matrix is used in the risk assessment process. These matrices provide a qualitative risk ranking that classifies the degree from very high to very low, as shown in Table V . The probability of risk ranges from zero to one. The threat impact can be classified in five states as shown in the following sets:
Probability of Risk = {Very Low, Low, Medium, High, Very High} and Impact of Risk = {Very Low, Low, Medium, High, Very High};
We calculate each query risk and evaluate the probability of the risk occurring against the security impact using the following equations: On the vertical axis, there is a probability of the risk occurring, thus a higher chance of that risk occurring and becoming an issue. The horizontal axis shows the level of impact in the assumption that the risk will occur. As shown in Figure 6 , the value outputs near to zero point to normal features, while outputs near to one indicate anomalous ones.
One of the advantages of this approach is being able to show risks and identify how risky they are on the database. If all the risks are clustered in the top right of the diagram, then evidently the database is very risky. In other words, it may be exploited by a malicious writer.
Response reaction.
In this stage, we will identify the best response against a database threat according to the level of severity. Once the risk is estimated from the previous stage, our approach can determine an appropriate action response. The reaction of our approach is responsible for providing a corresponding response action when an anomaly activity is detected.
Once the users' try to send a malicious string, an action is executed and the response action will handle this request according to a response policy. There are seven principle methods to handle risk. Table VI shows each response action according to the severity request.
Once the risk has been calculated, an appropriate action will be executed according to the severity level. To study a predictive model, with the ability to identify legitimate versus illegitimate connections within a computer network, the task for the classifier learning contest was organised in conjunction with the KDD '99 dataset. The KDD Cup (1999) database contained a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military network environment (Tavallaee et al., 2009) . Some intrusion experts suggest that most novel attacks are variants of known attacks, and the "signature" of known attacks can be sufficient to catch novel variants. The datasets contained 24 training attack types, with additional 14 types in the test data only. The KDD Cup (1999) contained 4,898,431 records in the training set (Tavallaee et al., 2009) . For the training set, only 19.85 per cent (972,781 records) were normal traffic and the remaining were attack traffic. Each record in the KDD Cup (1999) dataset contained 41 various quantitative and qualitative features (Tavallaee et al., 2009) . The data used in classification are NSL-KDD, which is a new dataset for the evaluation of researches in network IDS. NSL-KDD consists of selected records of the complete KDD'99 dataset. Each NSL-KDD connection record contains 41 features as shown in Table VII .
We conducted our study using Support Vector Machine (SVM) as classification. SVM categorises the data into two classes. Given a training set of dataset, labelled pairs {(x, y)}, where y is the label of instance x, SVM works by maximizing the margin to obtain the best performance in classification. SVM is based on the idea of a hyper plane classifier, where it first maps the input vector into a higher-dimensional feature space and then obtains the optimal separating hyper-plane (Horng et al., 2011) . The goal of SVM is to find a decision boundary. The boundary function of SVM is described by support vectors, which are the data points located closest to the class boundary. In the SVM, there are kernels, and any of those can be chosen to achieve the boundary function. Their detailed usages and descriptions, including parameters definitions are as follows: Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) is a supervised learning algorithm used for classification and regression, and it is a fast implementation of SVM. SMO has been selected to classify normal request and anomaly request because it is competitive with other SVM training methods such as Projected Conjugate Gradient "chunking", and in addition it is easier to implement in WEKA.
In this study, all the training and test data were applied. All data in the training data or test data consisted of 41 features. Each feature value was normalized to the range of [0, 1] , by dividing their maximum value, and removing the non-important features for each SVM classifier, as listed in Table  VIII .
We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach to answer what percentage our approach can detect. Validation of the models was achieved by using cross-validation. Crossvalidation is a technique used for evaluating the results of statistical analysis by generating an independent dataset for normal and anomaly data. The most common types of cross-validation were repeated using random sub-sampling validation and K-fold cross-validation. For this research study, K-fold cross-validation has been selected for validation, as it is commonly adopted for many classifiers. In the K-fold cross-validation, the data are first partitioned into K-sized segments or folds. Then, K iterations of training and validation are performed; within each iteration, a different fold of the data is held out for validation, while the remaining K-1 folds are used for learning. The advantage of K-fold cross-validation is that all the examples in the dataset are eventually used for both training and testing. In addition to this, all observations are used for both training and validation, and each observation is used for validation once only.
We evaluated various algorithms based on the following standard performance measures:
• After applying the four SVM kernels functions, if the received request from the SIDS stage has normal behaviour as the KDD data behaviors, the system will make the decision that no attack is present. If the received request has an abnormal behaviour, then the third stage will decided the appropriate response against the attack type.
Risk level
In fuzzy logic, notions and membership functions define the dataset. Membership functions define the truth-value of such linguistic expressions. The degree of membership of an object in a fuzzy set is defined as a function where the universe of discourse (set of values that the object can take) is the domain, and the interval [0, 1] is the range (Wu and Mendel, 2011) .
Based on set theory, fuzzy logic provides a powerful way to define the risk level. Using the FIS editor of a Matlab fuzzy toolbox, we can define input and output names through our implementation, as shown in Figure 7 .
Then, using the member function editor, we present membership function of each input parameter corresponding to its range as shown in Figure 8 . 
Response action
Once we finish the risk level, the next step is to determine the response action, as shown in Table VI . The selection method for an alert can be achieved by a set of the following "if-then" statements: For example, if the DREAD rating for SQL injection is 0.9 (Table IX) , according to the aforementioned statements, it executes a response action of high severity.
In addition, it allows adjusting attack metrics to make it more effective and more flexible against a specific type of attack. For instance, attack alerts with low severity level can be disregarded; attack alerts with medium severity level can be hold or audit; attack alerts with high severity level can be abort, disconnect or refuse.
Conclusion
Recently, prevention and detection IDSs have been an active research field in both industry and academia. While many detection and prevention solutions have been implemented, none of them guarantee a high level of security for web applications. The effectiveness of an IDS requests new demands to achieve a high degree of security. A detection system with a response system would be highly reliable against suspicious behaviour that could possibly be a zero day attack. In this paper, we developed IIDPS with a response action that provides an early-stage detection system. This IIDPS is capable of preventing and distinguishing various types of abnormal activity. Signaturebased detection techniques were used to recognize known attacks, while anomaly-based detection techniques were used to recognize unidentified attacks. A risk assessment was completed to respond to the attack, with several response techniques used to minimize the damage caused by malicious activities. 
